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In 1999 I wrote an article for a collection whose purpose was to offer a range of perspectives on 
the future of Methodism at the turn of the millennium (Craske and Marsh 1999). In that article I 
described my reasons for leaving the church in which I had been brought up (Clack 1999). In one 
of those quirks of memory, I had completely forgotten writing this article until reminded of it by an 
academic researching people’s reasons for church-leaving.1 This reminder came at a strange time: 
I had recently returned to the church, indeed, to the same Methodist tradition I had previously left. 
 
In what follows I reflect upon my reasons for this return which, when I revisited my previous piece, 
were strikingly similar to those that led me to leave. While those reasons reflect my own struggles 
to find a meaningful life, they also offer, I hope, some more general insights into the attraction of 
religious perspectives for some philosophers.   
 
The Heart Has Its Reasons 
It would be wrong to over-intellectualise my return to church. When feminist philosophers of 
religion like Pamela Sue Anderson argue for the significance of lived experience in the construction 
of knowledge (Anderson 1998), they offer a framework for considering religion that grounds it in the 
fullness of experience, not just in the out-workings of reason. Anderson is not alone in attempting 
to flesh out what makes for a religious position:  Amy Hollywood focuses on the under-theorised 
role of religious practice (Hollywood 2004), while Tina Beattie challenges the tendency of 
philosophers of religion to focus on examining belief at the expense of “the quest for a more holistic 
way of being and living in the world”(Beattie 2004: 120).  
 
It was not a simple engagement with the justifications for belief or non-belief that led to my return to 
Church practice. Rather, a mosaic of experiences paved the way over a number of years. I was not 
altogether conscious of the religious repositioning taking place. That does not surprise me: when it 
comes to religion, as with all other human activities, I subscribe to the Freudian view that 
unconscious desires and motivations shape our engagement with the world more than we might 
like. Logic, rationality and belief arrive rather late on the scene when it comes to the things that we 
do and believe (Clack 2012).  
 
Some of these experiences were prompted by the aesthetic. I remember sitting in silence in Antoni 
Gaudi’s extravagant church, the Sagrada Familia, in Barcelona, my eye following the delicate 
frond-like pillars up to the circle of light in its ornate ceiling. The use of vegetation in such a 
fabulous way opened up my sense of being part of the natural world, as well as the realisation that 
delight in the natural world can be just as much a part of Christianity as nature religions.  
 
Some of these experiences were emotional. I recall being profoundly affected by the celebration of 
the Eucharist in a tiny, ancient, candlelit chapel on the island of Papa Westray, the wind howling in 
the eaves, the midsummer twilight playing on the walls. Exploring the reasons for my return is not 
to play down the importance of these stirrings of the heart. Religion is never simply a matter of 
belief. The attempt to respond to the arguments of the logical positivists in analytic philosophy of 
religion - such a central part of undergraduate courses - does a disservice if it colludes with the 
suggestion that religion is either rational and coherent or it is meaningless.2  
 
1 Thanks to Charity Hamilton for drawing this piece to my attention.  
2 Richard Swinburne’s The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, remains a crucial text for 
how the subject understands its role. For a defence of logical positivism that challenges my view of the role 
given to it in 20th century philosophy of religion, see Brian R Clack’s essay ‘Religious Belief and the 
Disregard of Reality’ in Moral Powers, Fragile Beliefs, edited by Joseph Carlisle, James Carter and Daniel 
Whistler, London: T & T Clark, 2011, pp. 261-287. 
  
 
Philosophers of religion are increasingly aware of the disconnect between professional philosophy 
of religion and the practice of religion. Working with the resources to be found in continental 
philosophical traditions, increasing numbers are finding alternative ways of constructing the 
discipline’s engagement with religion (Anderson 2010; Moody and Shakespeare 2012; Pattison 
2001). Such approaches are not always without their own problems, most notably in the technical 
language that can leave non-specialists more adrift than when they started. This is unfortunate; not 
least because it suggests such alternative approaches are for a highly specialised audience rather 
than the wider (non-academic) world.  
 
At this point, I feel compelled to introduce that most unfashionable of academic ideals, depth. The 
limited scope of professional philosophy to enable the exploration of richer ways of living and 
thinking made me hungry for spaces where this might not be dismissed but embraced. In the 
churches were places where I felt I would be able to cultivate depth. InThe Shaking of the 
Foundations ([1949] 1962), Paul Tillich employed the language of depth psychology to develop a 
vision of Christian practise as a journey into the depths. Tillich is not an unproblematic figure,3 but 
that should not render all he says worthless. Written in the aftermath of the Second World War, I 
still find his approach extremely helpful for shaping my life. The model he advocates requires 
moving beyond the surface of our lives to better self-knowledge and thus richer ways of being. If he 
was not able to live according to the standard he set, it does not mean that we should not try to 
follow this pattern.  
 
Similarly, some churches may construe worship as another form of entertainment in an age of 
distractions. This does not rule out the possibility that some churches might cultivate space for 
silence, stillness and quiet reflection. Recent works by Sara Maitland (2009) and Diarmaid 
MacCulloch (2014) suggest the possibility of revisiting these neglected features of life which stand 
in stark contrast to a world shaped by what Ansgar Allen calls “the narcotic of constant activity” 
(Allen 2015: 6). That one might yearn for some kind of deep connection to the universe, or some 
deeper sense of one’s self, can seem quaint and out of place in this noisy world.4 Yet only the 
pursuit of depth meets my desire for the kind of serious enquiry that leads not just to knowledge, 
but to wisdom.    
 
Bringing together academic philosophy with that quest for wisdom is no easy task. Philosopher and 
motorcycle mechanic Matthew Crawford’s Shop Class as Soul Craft (2010) goes some way to 
breaking the mould of academic philosophy. Crawford makes the case for manual labour as an 
undervalued way of establishing a meaningful life. This is an unusual book, weaving together 
personal experience and philosophical and social critique with an agenda for enabling better ways 
of living. That it is unusual says much about a professional philosophy removed from the issues 
facing people outside the academy. The downplaying of ‘existential’ themes that might speak to 
non-academics in favour of more arcane forms of discourse, valued for their cleverness, is a 
problem enshrined by the mechanisms determining academic merit. In the church there is the 
possibility of a place to do the serious reflection that is so difficult to pursue in the contemporary 
academy.   
 
Reasons and Returning 
What surprised me on re-reading my 1999 article was the way in which the reasons I gave for 
leaving church mirrored my reasons for returning. Two aspects lay at the heart of that original 
decision. The first related to the Church’s complicity in misogyny; the second (the aspect to which I 
gave greatest weight) concerned how best to understand the relationship between the divine and 
the world.5 The Church has a long way to go when it comes to gender empowerment and the 
 
3 See Hannah Tillich’s From Time to Time (1973). 
4 See Mark Edmundsen, Self and Soul: A Defence of Ideals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 2015 for a reappraisal 
of the values of the soul for the modern world. 
5 I am more comfortable using the word ‘divine’ than the word ‘God’. That analytic philosophy of religion has 
obsessed about the concept of God as the expense of other religious concepts and practises is, I think, 
 
  
acceptance of sexual diversity, but it alone cannot bear the weight of a sexist society. Misogyny 
remains a feature of life, with or without the church.6 The continuing male-domination of political 
and cultural life suggests that it is not just the church that has a problem. Just as it makes sense to 
work to combat sexism in society, so recognising sexism in the church need not necessitate 
walking away, but might better be addressed by working with others to challenge it. 
 
How best to value the world is the part of the article which continues to resonate. Contrary to the 
claims of my younger self, I am not now convinced that the exclusion of the Christian God from our 
understanding of that world offers a better way of enabling the positive flourishing of human 
beings. While I did not subscribe to Freud or Marx’s view that the eradication of religion would 
necessarily lead to greater human happiness, the forms of religion I turned to were post-Christian 
(Clack 1999: 90-93). I am not now convinced that this post-Christian move is necessary. The 
desire for a form of religion that challenges assumptions of what constitutes political ‘progress’ and 
that takes seriously evil and suffering led me back to the symbol of the Cross. That we need to 
think again about what constitutes success and what makes for failure seems to necessitate the 
framework of a religion that places the realities of pain and loss at its heart.7 
 
For an age confronted by the phenomenon of religious terrorism, it hardly needs saying that 
religion can be used by charlatans, the callous and the inadequate to justify their failure to care for 
others. Monotheism may be peculiarly problematic as it can lend itself all-too-easily to exclusive 
ways of thinking detrimental to the plurality of positions that Hannah Arendt suggests are 
necessary for a healthy public sphere (Arendt [1958] 1998).8 We deceive ourselves, however, if we 
think the problems of mono-thinking are limited to the religious sphere. Consider the economic 
consensus which emerged in the late 1970s and which determined the political priorities of 
Western societies. This ‘neoliberal’ consensus embraced conservative and social democratic 
movements, going largely unchallenged until the global financial crisis of 2008.9 David Harvey 
offers a succinct definition of its key features: 
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade (2005: 2). 
 
Societies which have adopted this model have become increasingly subjugated to the demands of 
a triumphant and, ultimately, destructive capitalism (Goodchild 2002). Religious practice, I contend, 
provides a model for challenging such ideas. For me, this means returning to Christianity; for 
others it might be found in alternative religious forms. That religious practice offers the possibility of 
reaching out beyond the self and connecting with something beyond the desires of the individual 
 
extremely unhelpful: not least because the word ‘God’ can too-easily lead to assumptions that the divine is a 
being like ourselves, only greater.  
6 For an example, see Catharine Buni and Soraya Chemaly, ‘The Unsafety Net: How Social Media Turned 
Against Women’, The Atlantic, October 9, 2014.    
7 Alan Lewis’ Between Cross and Resurrection: A Theology of Holy Saturday, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm 
B Eerdmans, 2001, presents a powerful theological and cultural critique of some of the challenges facing 
contemporary ideas of meaning read through the narrative of the three days of Easter. 
8 See Laurel Schneider’s critique of ‘the logic of the One’ in Beyond Monotheism: A Theology of Multiplicity, 
London: Routledge, 2008. 
9 The history of neoliberalism is a complex one. While faith in the market, coupled with the commitment to an 
ideal of human freedom, might well be viewed as the 21st century hegemony, it takes on different forms 
reflecting its manifestation in particular cultural contexts (2005, chapter 4). Jamie Peck has gone so far as to 
describe these as “mongrel, shape-shifting forms” (Peck 2010: 276); Philip Mirowski, similarly, describes the 
difficulty of identifying neoliberalism as an ideology, suggesting the most effective way of understanding its 
hold on attitudes to economics, subjectivity and society is to consider it as a ‘movable feast’ (Mirowski 2014: 
50), a ‘Russian doll’ (p. 43) of interlinking ideas, set out by the Mont Pelerin Society, which group around 
“general issues such as liberty and private initiative” (p. 47).   
  
and economics enables different ways of thinking about the nature of human existence. It also, I 
think, offers the possibility of different, richer ways of being human.   
 
Being Human in a Neoliberal Age 
Let us, first, consider the dominant model for human subjectivity which arises from neoliberal 
economic models. This model of subjectivity can be viewed as an inheritor of European 
Enlightenment vision of the human subject as rational, autonomous, and capable of choice. In its 
contemporary iteration, it takes on a particular economic construction, individual destiny being 
shaped through the ability to make rational choices in a market place; choices invariably shaped in 
terms of the ability to purchase and consume the material goods deemed necessary for a 
meaningful life. 
 
That every aspect of life can be boiled down to a series of economic transactions suggests 
something of the problem this model has for understandings of what it means to flourish as a 
human being. In the reification of ‘the Market’ as the arbiter of all value, human life in all its 
wonderful, messy complexity is reduced to a series of figures on a spread sheet. The promoting of 
utility at the cost of all other considerations is not new (Arendt [1958] 1998; Scott 1998); the form it 
takes, at this point in late modernity, is. The lack of any other transcendent value to challenge the 
Market in the public arena lends itself to the diminishment not only of human life. As Philip 
Goodchild points out, this mindset has severe consequences for the wider ecosystem, seen as 
worthwhile only when formulated as a commodity that can be bought and sold (Goodchild 2002). 
Even an event as cataclysmic for this economic system as the 2008 global financial crisis did not 
undermine the desire that it ‘should’ work, Philip Mirowski noting the ease with which a crisis 
revealing the fragility of global capitalism was used to ensure a retrenchment of its values: the 
‘solution’ to the problem was more competition, more privatisation, more of the same (Mirowski 
2014).   
 
Neoliberalism is successful because it gets people to see themselves in a way conducive to the 
needs of the market. The neoliberal subject is an entrepreneurial self. Viewed as a business, the 
aim is to maximise one’s talents and skills in order to achieve the kind of successful, affluent life 
that all are deemed to desire. This competent self corresponds rather well to the vision we like to 
have of ourselves. Yet this model is not without an impact on ethical behaviour. Viewing the self as 
entrepreneurial necessitates the promotion of self-interest. Competition becomes a necessary way 
of considering our neighbours. Cooperation is only possible so long as I get something out of it. 
The goal of all this striving? One achieves the resources necessary for self-expression, the lifestyle 
I create being dependent upon my purchasing power (Rose 1999). When relationships are viewed 
principally as economic transactions, there is little space for the realisation that as social animals 
we need each other, not just to survive, but to flourish.    
 
Recognising the importance of the social realm for shaping and sustaining us opens up the 
question of what makes for good community. My return to the church was paved by a craving for 
community: and not just the kind of community defined by the sameness of the people we meet 
through our work or the places we live, determined as they are by similar socio-economic groups. I 
wanted a greater sense of connection beyond those comfortable parameters. In part, the desire for 
diversity was met by my growing involvement with a political party. Here were a group of people - 
many I wouldn’t have met in my ordinary shuffling between home and work - who were united by a 
broad set of shared ideals which they believed capable of creating a better kind of society, and 
which they were actively working to realise.  
 
In returning to church, I deliberately sought out a similarly diverse group of people committed to a 
transcendent ideal for shaping the good life.10 We might have differences in our respective 
theologies, but what we share unites us more than our differences. There is a shared recognition of 
something that is more than the self, something that is considered to transcend human desires and 
 
10 The congregation at Cowley Road Methodist Church in Oxford is relatively small (between 35 and 40 
regular attenders), but mixed in terms of ethnicity, class, gender and age.  
  
preferences.11 There is the desire to find a way of living well in the world. Others will find similar 
patterns outside organised religion. For me, it is in the community and shared practices of the 
church that I find a vital context for a more connected, more human way of living.   
 
Thinking Creatively 
When I came out of the church, I did so in order to reclaim what I called rather grandly “the 
freedom to think” (Clack 1999: 96). The discussion of whether a particular theological idea was 
‘Christian or not’ was a barrier to thinking creatively. Given a context where neoliberal paradigms 
are like the air we breathe (McLuhan 2005), providing space for challenges to these commonly 
accepted tropes makes the church feel less like a strait jacket and more like a place where  
countercultural ways of reflecting are possible. 
 
That religious perspectives might enable different ways of thinking resonates with the role Michele 
Le Doeuff’s account of philosophical practice is playing in my feminist philosophy of religion. 
Towards the end of her essay on the exclusion of women from the history of philosophy (1989), Le 
Doeuff describes the pull of religion for those who, like her, are not religious but who are attempting 
to shape alternative accounts of philosophy: 
 
Still confused, I now open Pascal - and I suddenly see why, however foreign the religious 
concepts of his work are to me, I feel more ‘at home’ in the Pensees than in any of the 
other classic texts. It is because the religious perspective hints at this penumbra of 
unknowledge (a penumbra which has nothing to do with the limits of reason), which 
metaphysics has denied. Here is a form of writing which does not claim to reconstruct and 
explain everything, which slides along the verge of the unthought, develops only by 
grafting itself on to another discourse, and consents to be its tributary. (1989: 127; my 
emphasis.) 
 
The religious perspective, Le Doeuff argues, opens up ways of thinking which allow for uncertainty. 
The kind of religious practice I value is, likewise, more concerned with opening up than closing 
down our engagement with a universe that is so much more than human thought and society. That 
the universe transcends human thought and structures encourages a kind of humility, recognising 
in our smallness the greater reality of the cosmos. The recognition of limits enables resistance to 
the arrogant reductionism which dogs contemporary science, politics, economics and, indeed, 
forms of religion itself. For Le Doeuff, Pascal’s willingness to recognise openness undercuts 
temptations to absolutism in thinking. No one master or paradigm has the true answer. Accepting 
that this is the case opens up richer forms of philosophical practice. Rather than commit to one 
school of thought, or to one master, philosophy becomes simply that which we do. It is “an 
unfinished philosophical discourse, never closed and never concluded” (1989: 126); an incomplete 
practice that involves “the abandonment of any totalizing aim” (1989: 127).  
 
Rejecting the role of the master obviously challenges commitment to any particular religion. 
Arguably Christianity has a particular problem given the role of Christ: as Rosemary Ruether asked  
in the early 1980s, “can a male saviour save women?” (Ruether 1983: 116) The question remains 
important, but given the variety of Christological approaches it need not be insurmountable. What 
Le Doeuff suggests is that religious frameworks can be capable of supporting open, critical 
reflection.  When the value of human life is lost to the dictates of economic forces, a framework 
developed over two millennium, reflecting different ways of thinking about the human condition, 
may be particularly well-suited to challenging contemporary cultural narratives that diminish what it 
is to be human.   
 
Against a backdrop that makes easy promises about what you can be if you only work hard 
enough (Adkins 2002), a narrative that returns us to contemplation of those things that place 
necessary limits on such striving is to be valued. The Christian framework is helpful for me as it 
 
11 For a fuller expression of this idea, see Stewart Sutherland’s God, Jesus and Belief, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1984, where he sets out a vision of a revised theism. 
  
provides stories that engage with the painful aspects of life: loss, failure, death. These things are 
not aberrations but part of the rich fabric of every life. Rather than ignore their reality, we might 
instead work with the key aspects of the Christian story - Good Friday, Holy Saturday, Easter 
Sunday; failure, disappointment, new life - in order to find better ways of living with each other.12 
 
Conclusion 
This is a personal piece, yet I hope it can contribute to the discussion of the relationship between 
religion and philosophy. The attraction of religion as a focus for academic enquiry may say 
something about the desire for a better understanding of the relationship between personal 
concerns and philosophical questioning. Religion is never simply a matter of belief. To suggest that 
the concern with belief should constitute the limits of philosophical engagement with religion 
suggests a paucity of approach both to its study and to the understanding of philosophy itself. 
Religious perspectives reflect the existential questions that professional philosophy has 
increasingly seen as irrelevant to its practices. Why am I here? What meaning might I ascribe to 
my life? What does it mean to live well? What does reflection on death and mortality mean for how 
I view and engage with this world? These questions require serious reflection on the things that 
shape our lives. In grappling with these questions lies the possibility of enriching rather than 
diminishing our current understandings of what it is to be human. 
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